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COUNTERACTING IDENTITY FRAUD IN THE
INFORMATION AGE: THE IDENTITY THEFT
AND ASSUMPTION DETERRENCE ACT
Kurt M. Saunders and Bruce Zuckert
identity, n; .. .2. (a) the condition or fact of being some specific
person...; individuality; (b) the condition of being the same as . . .
someone assumed, described, or claimed.'
ABSTRACT
The advent of the information age has created new challenges to the
ability of individuals to protect the privacy and security of their personal
information. One such challenge is that of identity theft, which has im-
posed countless hardships upon its victims. Perpetrators of this fraud use
the identities of others to steal money, obtain loans, and generally violate
the law. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998,
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, makes the theft of personal
information with the intent to commit an unlawful act a federal crime in
the United States with penalties of up to twenty-five years imprisonment
and a maximum fine of $250,000. This article first examines the problem
of identity fraud and the inadequacy of existing remedies, and then as-
sesses the need for and likely impact of the Act, as well as issues relating
to the effectiveness of its future enforcement.
INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of the Internet and the increasing number of
commercial transactions facilitated electronically, personal information
is flowing throughout the country and around the world at speeds never
before imagined. As a consequence, tax identification numbers, Social
Security numbers, driver's license information, fingerprints, and similar
private and confidential information are now more accessible than ever
before.2 An immense quantity of such information is often stored online
t The authors are Assistant Professors of Business Law at California State University,
Northridge.
1 WEBsTER's NEw TwmE CENT R Y DICIONARY 902 (2d ed. 1983).
2 See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Ano-
nymity, Digital Cash and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 483-91 (1996).
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in computer databases, 3 on proprietary networks of credit reference serv-
ices,4 and on the Internet.5
Described as the neoteric crime of the information technology era,
identity theft is the illicit use of another individual's identifying facts
(name, date of birth, Social Security number, address, telephone number,
or other similar information) to perpetrate an economic fraud by opening
a bank account, obtaining credit, applying for bank or department store
cards, or leasing cars or apartments in the name of another.6 How can
such information be misused?
. Consider the following scenario. Having impeccable credit, a person
we will name Ida, decides to purchase a new car at a local car dealership.
Intending to finance the purchase through credit arranged by the dealer,
Ida completes a standard application form. After it conducts a credit
check, the dealership denies her credit application. After further inquiry,
Ida discovers that the credit reporting agency lists twenty-six open lines
of revolving credit and three different car loans in her name. Further, the
report lists eight different residences over the past year. Even though Ida
believes that she has never made a delinquent payment, almost every one
of her creditors reports her in default.
There is one problem-Ida never opened any of these credit lines
herself. Someone stole her identity and used her perfect credit to obtain
tens of thousands of dollars worth of goods and services. After exhaust-
ing her credit limit, these con-artists move on to the next unwitting vic-
tim, leaving Jane and her ruined credit in their wake.7 What, if anything,
can she do next?
3 The Department of Health and Human Services, the Selective Service System, and the
Internal Revenue Service all cross-reference information using Social Security numbers. As a
result, "anyone who knows an individual's SSN can amass a wealth of highly sensitive infor-
mation about that individual." George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the
Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. Rnv. 521, 526 (1990).
4 The three credit reporting agencies - Experian, Equifax, and Transamerica - store the
credit information for countless numbers of consumers in their systems.
5 Indeed, the Internet is a veritable treasure trove of personal information where, starting
with a person's name and address, one can find out, in a relatively short amount of time, "what
you do for a living, the names and ages of your spouse and children, what kind of car you
drive, the value of your house and how much taxes you pay on it." Joshua Quittner, Invasion of
Privacy, TPME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 33 (quoting Carole Lane, NAKED iN CYBEaspAca: How TO
FiND PERSONAL INFORMATMON ONum (1997)). See also The Stalker's Home Page: A Stalking
We Go! (visited Feb. 21, 1999) http://www.glr.com/stalk.html (listing hyperlinks to web sites
containing addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, property taxes, and similar
information).
6 Mark Grossman, The Other You: The Misery of Identity Theft, BRoWARD DAILY Bus.
Rav., Sept. 4, 1998, at B1.
7 For other illustrations of hardships suffered by victims of identity theft, see, e.g., Evan
Hendricks ed., Identity Theft Key to Major Medical Fraud Operation, PRIVACY TIMEs, Feb. 6,
1998, at 3-4; Are You a Target for Identity Theft?, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 1997, at 11; Brigid
McMenamin, Invasion of the Credit Snatchers, FoRBEs, Aug. 26, 1996, at 257; An Identity
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According to one major credit bureau, an estimated 480,000 people
in the United States inquire into its fraud division annually. 8 Authorities
estimate that identity theft imposes a cost on consumers approaching
$100 million annually.9 The United States Secret Service, which tracks
major identity theft cases, reports that the dollar value of such cases has
nearly doubled in the last year, and the Social Security Administration
has seen a threefold increase in improper use of Social Security num-
bers.10 According to credit reporting firms, fraud reports have climbed
from less than 12,000 annually in 1992, to more than 500,000
currently. 11
Using readily available technology, perpetrators of identity crimes
typically break into computer databases containing personal identifica-
tion information. Other times, they simply copy or modify fingerprints
recorded or transmitted electronically.' 2 In a prepared statement
presented to Congress on this issue, the Federal Trade Commission illus-
trated other such means by which identity thieves carry out their
schemes:
Historically, identity thieves have accomplished
their crimes through simple means-pickpocketing wal-
lets, stealing pre-approved credit applications from mail-
boxes, or raiding trash dumpsters for discarded receipts
and files. Recently, more sophisticated schemes are
gaining popularity. One such method is securing low-
level employment with a financial institution or other en-
tity that gives the perpetrator access to consumer credit
reports, or other identifying data, for their personal ex-
ploitation or for use by organized identity theft rings. For
example, one fraud ring used such credit reports quickly
to acquire fake I.D. cards, open "instant credit" accounts,
and then run up thousands of dollars in debt. A recent
case brought by the United States Secret Service demon-
Crisis: Credit-reporting Companies Need to Imporve Ways of Dealing with Consumer Claims
of Fraud, Kathy Kristof, Cm. TPam. (NoRTH), Sept. 24, 1996, § 6, at 7; Robert Lemos, Identity
Theft a Big Business, ZDNEr NEws, April 15, 1998, (visited Apr. 28, 1999) <http://www.
zdnet.com/zdnn/content/zdnn/0414/306824.html>.
8 Identity theft: How to Take Steps to Clear Your Name, ORANGE COUNTY REG., August
23, 1998, at K4.
9 Grossman, supra note 6, at B 1.
10 Kathy M. Kristof, New Law to Assist Victims in Fight Against Identity Fraud, Los
ANG EES TiEs, October 31, 1998, at Cl, C3.
11 Id.
12 Theft and misuse of biometric identification data, including voice, retinal, and facial
prints, are possible. See, e.g., Robert Lemos, Protecting Your Digital ID, ZDNr NEws, Feb-
ruary 13, 1998 (visited Apr. 28, 1999) <www.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/zdnn/0213/285183.
hunl>.
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strates how computer-savvy identity thieves may exploit
information available over the Internet. In that case, the
defendants were a Maryland couple who pled guilty in
September 1997 to running up debt exceeding $100,000
under their stolen identities. They admitted to routinely
using Internet databases to select their victims.' 3
This article examines the problems created by identity theft and ex-
plores recently enacted federal legislation intended to further proscribe it
and offer assistance to its victims. Part I considers the nature and role of
identity in society, including the inadequacy of existing statutory and
common law to prohibit and redress identity theft. Part II discusses the
material provisions of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
of 1998, and assesses its probable effect on enforcement. Part III
presents observations and comments of these authors as to the Act's
likely impact on curtailing such crime and discusses some suggestions
for effective enforcement.
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY IN SOCIETY AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE ROLE OF THE
LAW IN ITS PROTECTION
A. IDENTITY, AUTHENTICATION, AND PRIVACY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION.
The notion of identity is inseparable from a person's intrinsic nature
and sense of individuality. Among other things, it relates to a person's
conscious sense of "self' and individuality, while also allowing others to
recognize or distinguish him or her from others.' 4 In society, the concept
of identity is broader than merely knowing a person's name or recogniz-
ing a person's face. Rather, the identity of a person is often separate
from his or her attributes and physical traits. In many instances, to learn
or establish the identity of a person involves reference to some set of
institutional or socially agreed upon identifying factors that authenticate
a person's uniqueness in relation to others.
13 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on "Identity Theft" Before the
Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit
Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter FTC State-
ment]. See also Official Transcript of "FTC Consumer Identity Fraud Meeting," Aug. 20,
1996 at 11-13 (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/conferences.htm>. The Federal
Trade Commission maintains a privacy page at its web site to advise consumers how to protect
personal information and how to obtain assistance in the event if they are victimized by iden-
tity theft. (visited Feb. 21, 1999) <http:l/www.ftc.gov/privacy/ndex.hfnl>.
14 For an extensive treatment of the concept of "identity" in its social and cultural con-
text, see generally Eim H. ERIKSON, IDEnrYA arN m Lna CYcLE (1980).
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Likewise, a person's identity, as well as the ability to prove it, is
fundamental to many commercial and institutional transactions. For in-
stance, businesses need to be assured that the person signing a contract or
accepting delivery of goods is in fact who he says he is. Banks may
require proof that the person who telephones to request information
about her account or appears to make a withdrawal is in fact the same
person who opened the account. In order to evidence identity, many in-
stitutions have resorted to systems that employ identifiers-such as So-
cial Security or telephone numbers, mothers' maiden names, or birth
dates-that are not necessarily unique or that may be easily discovered.
They may issue identification devices-such as driver's licenses or
membership cards-that may be readily stolen or duplicated. Some-
times, one institution or entity may use an identification document issued
by another institution or entity as a means of establishing or authenticat-
ing a person's identity. This occurs, for example, when an airline or
tavern requires production of a government issued photo identification.
Nevertheless, these apparently reliable solutions provide easy op-
portunities for corruption, fraud, and error. 15 These problems have been
further exacerbated by the emergence of information technologies such
as computerized databases and networks that can facilitate commercial
and institutional transactions between parties separated by great distance
or known to one another solely through the use of pseudonyms.' 6 In
such an environment, the opportunities for corruption, identity fraud, and
error are substantially increased. Indeed, the emergence of the Internet
as a potential new marketplace has underscored the need to establish se-
cure and reliable means of identity authentication for electronic com-
merce. Presently used identity authentication procedures include
passwords, data encryption systems, digital signatures, and firewalls,
alone or in combination, 17 to ensure trust and confidentiality in the agree-
ment formation process.18
15 Virginia Ellis, DMV Tries to Stem the Tide of Fake Licenses, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1998, at Al, A26.
16 Closely related to the issue of identity protection is the issue of whether anonymity in
electronic communications should be legally guaranteed as a matter of free speech and pri-
vacy. See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J. ONurm L. 4 <http:ll
www.law.cornell.edu/jol/froomkin.htm>.
17 These security methods are discussed in Stimson Garfinde & Gene Stafford, Wn
SEcurrY AN CommRCE (1997).
18 See Jane K. Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Com-
merce, 72 TUL. L. Rnv. 1177, 1202 (1998); Matthew D. Ford, Identity Authentication and 'E-
Commerce,' 3 J. Irao. L. & TEc. 1 (Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.law.warwick.ac.uk/jilt198-3/
ford.html>; Anthony Ferraro, Electronic Commerce: The Issues and Challenges to Creating
Trust and a Positive Image in Consumer Sales on the World Wide Web, FIRST MONDAY (1998)
(visited Dec. 8, 1998) <http://www.firstmonday.dkissuesissue3_6/ferrero/index.html>.
666 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:661
The unfortunate story of Terry Rogan, the plaintiff in Rogan v. City
of Los Angeles,19 illustrates how identity theft and inaccuracy of elec-
tronically stored information may turn into an ordeal. In 1981, McK-
andes, an escapee from an Alabama state prison, began using Rogan's
name after he obtained a copy of Rogan's birth certificate in Michigan.
McKandes then relocated to California and used Rogan's birth certificate
to obtain a driver's license and other identification documents in Rogan's
name. In early 1982, McKandes, who was still using Rogan's identity,
was arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) on suspi-
cion of murder, but was later released. Several months later, a California
court issued an arrest warrant in the name of "Terry Dean Rogan," charg-
ing him with two robbery-murders which had occurred in Los Angeles.
The police entered the warrant information into a national computer
criminal information database known as the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), ensuring that every police officer in the United States
would have access to, and could thereby become aware of, the outstand-
ing warrant in the name of Terry Dean Rogan. Information containing
McKandes' physical characteristics and fingerprints was added in June
.1982.
In October 1982, Rogan was arrested by police on suspicion of tres-
pass in Saginaw County, Michigan. The Michigan police discovered the
robbery-murder warrant when they made an inquiry of the NCIC
database. When the police compared Rogan's fingerprints and physical
characteristics with those recorded in NCIC, they established that he was
not the suspect wanted by the LAPD. Although the LAPD automatically
removed the NCIC information after his October arrest, they reentered
the same information containing Rogan's name in November 1982. In
early 1983, county sheriff's deputies stopped Rogan's car in Saginaw,
Michigan for failure to use a turn signal.
When the robbery-murder warrant information resurfaced during
the routine computer check, the deputies ordered Rogan out of his car at
gunpoint, searched, handcuffed, and took him into custody. While in
jail, they handcuffed him to the metal bars of his cell while the police
contacted the LAPD and the Saginaw police. The police released him
two hours later once they clarified his true identity.
Later in 1983, police again stopped Rogan for a traffic offense and
detained him due to the inaccurate NCIC information. The police later
released Rogan. In July 1983, Rogan was driving from Michigan to
Oklahoma to visit relatives when he was arrested by the Texas police.
They released him only after they first stopped him, arrested him at gun-
point, handcuffed him based on the NCIC information and held him in
19 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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jail pending an investigation of his true identity. This process was re-
peated yet again in January 1984, in Saginaw, Michigan when a deputy
sheriff stopped Rogan for driving without headlights. Finally, after that
incident, the LAPD removed the NCIC record in Rogan's name.
Rogan brought suit against the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for deprivation of his constitutional rights due to a mistaken
arrest.20 The court held that the LAPD's use of the NCIC database was
grossly negligent and awarded judgment to Rogan as a matter of law for
the pain and humiliation suffered as a result of his experience. 21
B. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LAW AND THE NEED FOR NEw
LEGISLATION
Common Law
Surprisingly, the legal system has not yet criminalized identity
fraud. Under the federal criminal code, an individual who knowingly
produces, uses, or traffics in false identification devices with the intent to
defraud is subject to a maximum of twenty years in prison.22 Assuming,
however, that no false documents or identification devices are involved,
nothing in the existing federal statutory scheme specifically prohibits a
person from illegally assuming the identity of another individual with the
intent to engage in fraudulent activity. Moreover, the United States Se-
cret Service investigates and prosecutes only a small portion of these
cases under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes. 23 Because many of
these crimes involve such small amounts of money, they are too insignif-
icant to justify use of limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, 24
As the Rogan25 case demonstrates, many identity thieves commit
their frauds without ever obtaining a single identification document from
the victim by simply appropriating information publicly available on In-
ternet databases or elsewhere.
[lit's easy for the computer-literate among us to
generate credit card numbers, because they are con-
20 Id. at 1386-87.
21 Id. at 1391. In another case of identity theft, the defendant searched through the desks
of the victims to find social security numbers and other personal information and then fraudu-
lently obtained credit cards. During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, two victims
described how they faced arrest, were denied credit, and were forced to pay in cash and pro-
duce identification as a result of the defendant's fraud scheme. United States v. Wells, 101
F.3d 370, 372 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1996).
23 See Kristof, supra note 10.
24 144 Cong. Rec. H9993, H9994 (daily ed. October 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
25 668 F.Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See also supra text accompanying notes 3-5, and
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structed by using a fixed mathematical procedure. Hav-
ing generated, say, a hundred numbers, I can call a credit
bureau and ask to verify a number. Having found a
number in actual service - let's say yours - I could then
call your bank, and giving your social security number
(or address details, or mother's maiden name, or
whatever else the bank uses to check identity), ask for a
billing address change. Using the changed address, I
could then charge purchases against your credit card, is-
sue myself new credit cards or checkbooks and withdraw
cash from your account.26
Once the thief garners the identifying information, documents are
readily obtainable.27
Similarly, there appears to be no adequate civil remedy in tort be-
cause the common law does not recognize identity as a personal or prop-
erty interest that should be protected from wrongful conduct.28 Although
tangible identification documents,29 such as credit cards or driver's
licenses, are personal property, they are merely indicia of their owner's
identity. No court has ever classified an individual's identity as tangible
personal property. The tort of fraud occurs when a defendant makes a
misrepresentation of fact in order to induce another to act in reliance
upon it,3° but fraud is of no use to a victim of identity theft. A misrepre-
sentation is fraudulent if the defendant knows or believes that the matter
is not what he or she represents it to be.3 1 The defendant is liable to the
person who suffered a pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the mis-
representation.32 As such, under this theory, only the victim of the fraud
itself, rather than the victim of identity theft, would have recourse against
the defendant.
Invasion of privacy by the appropriation of name or likeness might
also seem to offer relief. Invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or
likeness occurs when the defendant appropriates the plaintiff's name or
26 GREGORY J.E. RAWLINrs, Moms TO TiE FLAM: T SEDucunoN OF CoMPrn
TECHNOLOGY 10 (1996). See also Craig Bicknell, Credit Card Fraud Bedevils Web, WnmD
NEws (April 2, 1999) (visited Sept. 7, 1999) <www.wired.com/news/news/business/story/
18904.html> (describing computer programs that generate credit card numbers that will pass
an authorization check).
27 Rogan. 668 F.Supp. at 1387.
28 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 224 Cmt.d (1965).
29 An identification document is made or issued by a government and, "when completed
with information concerning a particular individual, is a type intended or commonly accepted
for the purpose of identification of individuals." Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(2) (1999).
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
31 See id. § 526.
32 See id. §§ 525, 531.
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image without consent for the defendant's own advantage.33 This tort is
not concerned with pirating the plaintiff's name per se, but with taking
the plaintiff's name for the defendant's commercial advantage, such as
"to advertise the defendant's product, or to accompany an article sold, to
add luster to the name of a corporation, or for other business purposes." 34
Thus, a defendant is not liable unless he or she has used the plaintiff's
name or likeness to imply the plaintiffs endorsement of the defendant's
product or relationship to the defendant's business. Some courts have
used this form of liability to recognize a right of publicity akin to a prop-
erty right but have extended it only to celebrities and public figures.35
Federal Law
As to the protection of information itself, including data that may be
used to establish or authenticate identity, existing law focuses upon con-
cerns of security and privacy. Various federal statutes restrict the ac-
cumulation, storage, and distribution of information; other laws are
designed to ensure that the information stored and distributed is accu-
rate.36 The Privacy Act, for example, regulates the maintenance and dis-
closure of personal data and personally identifiable information held by
the federal government.37 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act imposes
criminal penalties for the intentional and unauthorized access to govern-
ment and federal interest computers for the purpose of altering, damag-
ing, or destroying information.38 Under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, sanctions are imposed for unauthorized interception or dis-
closure of, as well as unauthorized access to, electronic communications
stored in a facility involved in electronic communications services and
for knowingly divulging the content of such communications while in
storage.39 While these laws have aided in limiting the threat of a dra-
matic decrease in privacy and an inevitable increase in losses due to inac-
curate information, they provide little or no relief for the victims of
identity theft and misuse.40
33 See id. §§ 652A, 652C.
34 W. PAGE KEETON, ET ALL., PROSSER AND KELTON ON Tm LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
852 (5th ed. 1984). In addition, the piracy for other purposes such as, "impersonation to obtain
credit or secret information, or by posing as the plaintiff s wife of providing a father for a child
on a birth certificate" also constitutes invasion of privacy. Id
35 See e.g. White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-1400 (9' Cir. 1992).
36 Several states have enacted statutes that criminalize information theft. E.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-8-102(c) (1994); Omo REv. CODE § 2901.01 (10)(a), (3)G) (Anderson 1999); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4(1)(3) (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.010(5) (West
1999).
37 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1995).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1995).
39 Id. §§ 2510, 2511 (1995).
40 For a comprehensive discussion of information criminal and privacy protection law,
see generally RAYmoND T. NnimAR, INFORmA oN LAW f 8.01-.25 & 9.01-14 (1996).
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In addition, federal consumer credit protection statutes provide lim-
ited assistance to victims of identity fraud. For instance, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act regulates the collection and use of personal data by credit
reporting agencies by prohibiting disclosure of consumer credit reports
without consent, unless such disclosure is made for a legitimate business
reason.41 The Truth-in-Lending Act, enacted in 1968, is primarily a dis-
closure law that requires sellers and lenders to fully disclose credit or
loan terms to debtors.42 One amendment to the Truth-in-Lending Act,
known as the Fair Credit Billing Act, limits the liability of credit card-
holders to $50 per card for unauthorized charges made before the credit
card issuer is notified that the card has been lost or stolen.43 The use of a
credit card is unauthorized only when it is used without the permission or
approval of the cardholder.44
These various statutes have been ineffective in deterring identity
theft and providing relief to victims for several reasons. The laws have
been ineffective because their approach to the problems that result from
identity fraud is scatter-shot, with multiple statutes and government
agencies having jurisdiction over this misconduct. More importantly,
Congress enacted these laws with other purposes in mind, such as infor-
mation privacy or accuracy, and the statutory definitional language is
often too narrow to apply to identity theft. In addition, the statutes were
intended to protect financial institutions and therefore recognize creditors
as the victims, rather than the consumers.45 As will be discussed in the
next section, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act46 specifi-
cally defines identity theft as a crime, recognizes the consumer as the
victim, and provides for specific remedies and penalties.
THE IDENTITY THEFT AND ASSUMPTION DETERRENCE ACT
In 1997, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) introduced Senate Bill 512,
known commonly as the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1995).
42 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1995).
43 Id § 1643. The issuer must provide a method by which the user of the card could be
identified as the person authorized to use it. Regulation Z of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(2)(iii) (1999), provides that the identification may be
made by signature, photograph, or fingerprint on the credit card or by electronic or mechanical
confirmation.
44 A cardholder may authorize another person to use the card for a particular purpose; if
the person uses it for other than that purpose, the use is nonetheless considered to be author-
ized under principles of agency law regarding apparent authority, even though the purpose was
unauthorized. See Stieger v. Chevy Chase Savings Bank, 666 A.2d 479, 482-3 (D.C. 1995);
Band v. First Bankcard Center, 644 So.2d 211, 217 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
45 See FTC Statement, supra note 13, at 11-13.
46 Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028
(1999)).
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Congress passed the bill in October 1998 and it went into effect in Janu-
ary 1999.47 The Act intents to expressly criminalize identity theft, and
classify private citizens as direct victims of such conduct.48 In addition,
the Act directs the United States Sentencing Commission to incorporate
the crime of identity theft into the appropriate sections of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual and to select the appropriate corpo-
ral and financial sanction for federal judges to use at sentencing.49
The Act amends Title 18 of the United State Code to specifically
criminalize identity theft.50 As enacted, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (Fraud
and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents and
Information) will add the following pertinent language:
[Whoever] knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a
means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to
aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal
law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law,
[commits identity theft]. 51
The Act defines "means of identification" as any name or number
that may be used to identify a specific individual.5 2 The penalties for
violations of this section include fines, supervised release, and anywhere
from one to 25 years in custody.5 3
Under current law, federal courts are precluded from awarding resti-
tution to individuals who incur expenses associated with the theft of their
identities. If, for example, an individual spent several thousand dollars in
attorney fees in order to correct his credit history, to deal with various
47 Id. A parallel bill was introduced into the House of Representatives as H.R. 4151,
which became the final version of the bill that President William Jefferson Clinton signed into
law on October 30, 1998. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R.
4151, 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 703 (October 30, 1998 ).
48 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, § 3(a), (d), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028(a), (d)(3) (1999).
49 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 994 note
(1999). The United States Sentencing Commission is an autonomous board within the federal
judiciary charged with implementing sentencing practices and procedures in the federal system
that will "assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appro-
priate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes." 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1995) (au-
thority for empowering the Sentencing Commission to issue sentencing guidelines). See also
U.S. SmNTrmiNrcm GumEzam~s MAuAL § IA(1) (1998).
50 See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4151, 5
U.S.C.C.A.N. 703 (October 30, 1998).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (1999).
52 Id. § 1028(d)(3).
53 Id. § 1028(b). The severity of the penalties depend on the specifics of the crime. For
example, if the offense involved, "the transfer or use of one or more means of identifications"
and provided that stay perpetrator "obtains anything of value" amounting to at least $1,000
within any one period, the statutory minimum is 15 years imprisonment. Id. § 1028 (b)(1)(D).
If the identity theft offense involved such conduct as drug trafficking, a crime of violence, or
international terrorism, the statutory maximum may range anywhere from one year to 25 years
in custody. Id. § 1028(b)(3), (b)(4).
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creditors affected by the identity theft, or to clear his reputation, federal
courts could not award restitution of these expenses because this individ-
ual would not be considered a "victim. .. directly and proximately
harmed .... -54 Only direct victims of the fraudulent activity (such as
banks, merchants, or other such entities ultimately responsible for recti-
fying the damage) could receive awards of restitution.55 Although the
Senate version of the Act allowed for restitution to consumer victims, the
House version of the Act did not include such restitution. 56
Additionally, the Act instructs the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to amend the United States Sentencing Guidelines to include the
concept of "identity theft" into the relevant fraud-related guideline see-
tions.57 The Act gives the Sentencing Commission broad discretion in
how to carry out this mandate, 58 but does order it to consider, inter alia,
the extent to which the number of victims were involved in the offense,
the harm to a victim's reputation, a victim's inconvenience and other
difficulties resulting from the offense, the number of identification docu-
ments used by the perpetrator, and the extent to which the value of the
loss to any individual caused by the offense is somehow an inadequate
measure of appropriate penalty.59
A perfect illustration of the need for harsher punishment for identity
theft under the guidelines than is currently in place under existing law is
found in the case of United States v. Wells. 60 In Wells, the government
charged the offender with illegally acquiring personal information and
social security numbers of at least two individuals.61 She used this infor-
mation to obtain credit cards in the names of those individuals and com-
mitted the fraud accordingly.62
Wells pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud. 63 The district court
sentenced her to a 30-month term of imprisonment.64 In order to arrive
at the 30-month term, the district court elected to depart upward from the
sentencing guideline range. 65 In exercising its discretion to depart,66 the
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (1998). See also 18 U.S.C. §3663A(a)(2)(1999).
55 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (1998).
56 Compare-S. 512, 105"' Cong. § 3 (1998) with H.R. 4151, 105' Cong. (1998).
57 28 U.S.C. §994 note (1999).
58 "The United States Sentencing Commission shall consider ...any.. .factor that [it]
considers to be appropriate" in order to provide an "appropriate remedy" for the crime of
identity theft. Id.
59 Id.
60 101 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1996).
61 l at 371.
62 ld.
63 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1996).
64 Wells, 101 F.3d at 371.
65 Id.
66 The district court is bound to follow the United States Sentencing Guidelines when
imposing a sentence. However, it may depart from the guideline sentencing range whenever
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court considered the fact that individuals "whose identity Wells assumed
lost days from work, feared arrest, were forced to appear in court, strug-
gled to repair their credit rating, were not able to use the credit cards in
their possession, and still face problems connected with this offense." 67
The court in Wells observed that the Sentencing Guidelines did not
adequately take into account the "extreme personal victimization" that
the identity crimes can inflict upon their victims such that the court found
it necessary to take the unusual and rare step of departing from the range
of guidelines for imprisonment. 68
The last portion of the Act directs the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to establish a centralized clearinghouse to record and track com-
plaints, and to provide consumer education service for victims of identity
theft.69 Finally, the Act instructs the FTC to implement procedures for
referring complaints to the three major national consumer-reporting
agencies (Experian/TRW, TransUnion, and Equifax) and to channel them
to the respective law enforcement agencies for investigation. 70
THE IMPACT OF THE ACT
The Identity Theft and Assumption Act accomplishes two main
objectives. First, the Act provides for stiff penalties for perpetrators of
this crime7' and implements certain procedures for investigation and en-
forcement.72 Second, it directs the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
to establish procedures for educating the public, receiving complaints,
and coordinating enforcement efforts with various investigatory
agencies. 73
Regarding the first objective, the Sentencing Commission may
choose to enact harsh penalties for such conduct. Under the current sys-
tem, perpetrators of fraud receive sentencing enhancements in direct cor-
relation with the amount of loss caused by their activities,74 the amount
of planning involved,75 if a jointly undertaken activity, the level of so-
the court finds that, "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." U.S. SENTENCING
GunmmmEES MANUAL § IA (4)(b) (1998); U.S. SENTENCING GumI.NES MANUAL § 5K2.0
(1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1999); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
67 Wells, 101 F.3d at 374.
68 Id.
69 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, § 5, 18 U.S.C. §1028 note
(1999).
70 Id.
71 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (1999).
72 Id.
73 1d at note.
74 U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANUAL § 2Fl.l(b)(1) (1998).
75 Id. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).
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phistication of the role the perpetrator played, 76 the susceptibility and
status of the victims, 7 7 and the number of victims involved in the of-
fense.78 Depending upon the composition of the Sentencing Commis-
sion,79 it could enact a relatively harsh guideline for the imposition of
punishment for offenders of identity theft.80 Considering the unique na-
ture and consequences of identity theft, the Commission could establish a
guideline section that is distinct from Part B (Offenses Involving Prop-
erty) and Part F (Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit) of the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guidelines Manual, rather than incorporate it into one of the
existing guideline sections.8' This would ensure satisfactory considera-
tion of the various factors detailed in the Act.
As to the second objective, the Act makes clear that the FTC is the
primary agency responsible for its implementation and coordination of
enforcement. Congress directed the FTC to educate the public on iden-
tity theft, receive and document reports of such illicit conduct, coordinate
any complaints by consumers of identity theft with law enforcement, and
establish procedures for the public to file complaints.8 2 The Act gives
the FTC one year to accomplish these three primary tasks. However,
nothing in the Act provides for a periodic assessment of the success of
implementation or for the FTC to report to Congress whether it is in
compliance with these directives. There appears to be a need for such
assessment procedure.
Although the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act specifi-
cally recognizes identity theft as a distinct crime of its own, identifies
individual consumers as victims separate and apart from institutional vic-
tims, and provides for specific penalties and remedies, it remains unclear
as to whether it will have any tangible or measurable effect on deter-
rence, punishment, or providing any new remedies to its victims.
76 Il § 3B1.1.
77 Id. § 3Al.l(b)(1).
78 Id. § 2F.I(b)(2)(B).
79 In 1984, Congress established the nonpartisan body, consisting of seven voting mem-
bers (three of which must be federal judges, and no more than four may be from the same
political party.) However, the Republicans and Democrats have not compromised on any of
President Clinton's appointments. When Congress adjourned in October 1998, all but one
Commissioner had resigned. As of November 1998, all seven seats on the U.S. Sentencing
Commission were vacant. See Daniel A. Shaw, At Sentencing Commission, No One's Home:
Thanks to Politics, All Seven Seats are Empty, Los ANGELES DAImy JouRNAL, November 18,
1998, at 1.
80 The United States Sentencing Commission has significant influence over the level of
punishment that may be prescribed for any given crime. L
81 U.S SmrEcING Gtmnun.N's MANUAL §§ 2t, 2F (1998).
82 18 U.S.C. § 1028 note (1999).
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CONCLUSION
With the onset of the information age, the fundamental ability to
protect one's personal information and identity is now more in jeopardy
than ever. The widespread use of computer databases and the Internet to
store and transmit information have made identity theft even easier to
perpetrate. Indeed, empirical studies indicate that the number of crimes
related to identity theft is steadily increasing, with enormous cost to the
victims. Surprisingly, only a handful of states have acted to proscribe
this misconduct, which often involves interstate commerce, and identity
theft had not been specifically banned by federal legislation until the
present time. However, the enactment of the Identity Theft and Assump-
tion Deterrence Act of 1998 specifically criminalizes identity fraud and
empowers the federal courts to award consequential damages to victims
of such crimes.
When President Clinton signed the Act into law, he said, "as we
enter the Information Age, it is critical that our newest technologies sup-
port our oldest values."'83 Implementation of this act will further em-
power law enforcement, consumer protection agencies, and the public to
combat identity thieves and deter such conduct as society continues to
see the expansion of advanced technology.
83 See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 4151, 5
U.S.C.C.A.N. 703 (October 30, 1998).

